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HELLENISTIC KINGS, WAR, AND THE ECONOMY[1]

My title links together kings, war, and the economy, and the linkage is deliberate. I do not of course wish to suggest that Hellenistic kings did nothing but fight wars, that they were responsible for all the wars in the period, that royal wars were nothing but a form of economic activity, or that the economy of the kings was dependent purely on the fruits of military success, though there would be an element of truth in all these propositions. But I wish to react against the frequent tendency to separate topics that are related, the tendency to treat notions relating to what kings were or should be as something distinct from what they actually did, and the tendency to treat political and military history on the one hand as something separate from economic and social history on the other.

A number of provisos should be made at the outset. The title promises more than the paper can deliver; in particular, more will be said about kings and war than about kings and the economy. The subject is handled at a probably excessive level of generalization and abstraction. I talk about Hellenistic kings in general, but in practice it would obviously be necessary to draw distinctions between different dynasties, different times and places, and individual rulers, and some of those distinctions I shall indicate. Conclusions are provisional and subject to modification and considerable expansion in detail. Finally, two points of terminology. I use the word 'Hellenistic' for no better reason than out of the force of acquired habit, but of course the word and the concept are modern inventions that were unknown to the ancient world.[2] The continued use of the word perpetuates misleading assumptions, and there is a serious case for avoiding it altogether, though the impracticality of this is obvious. I also use the word 'king' as a conventional translation of the Greek *basileus*, though it should be said that the English 'king' and the Greek *basileus* do not necessarily have identical meanings and connotations, and ideally should not be treated as interchangeable.[3] But this is not the place to argue either of these two points any further.

I

I begin with a brief survey of some of the trends in the modern study of this subject, and take Rostovtzeff as my starting point. His great *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*[4] remains to this day one of the monuments of modern scholarship in ancient history, and it will continue to be used and admired for a long time to come, however easy it may be for later writers to criticize it and lay bare its weaknesses. I do not intend to attempt an evaluation of Rostovtzeff's views on the Hellenistic world as a whole, and in any case there has already been much discussion of Rostovtzeff's ideas and approach to ancient history in general, as well as to the

[1] This is a revised version of a paper originally delivered at seminars in St Andrews and at the Institute of Classical Studies in London. I am grateful to all the participants for their comments, but remain solely responsible for any errors of fact and interpretation.

[2] See now R. Bichler, *Hellenismus. Geschichte und Problematik eines Epochenbegriffes* (Darmstadt, 1983), with the comments by Ed. Will, *Gnomon* 56 (1984), 777–9.

[3] Cf. the comments of R. Drews, *Basileus. The Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece* (New Haven & London, 1983), 100, 103 on the connotations of the word 'king'; P. Carlier, *La Royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre* (Paris, 1984), vi–vii argues for the retention of the standard translation.

[4] 3 vols. (Oxford, 1941).

Hellenistic world in particular.[5] Moreover, Rostovtzeff is often a difficult and baffling writer. The reader frequently has the uneasy feeling of hearing voices, not just one single voice; different points of view coexist awkwardly within the same work and do not seem to be harmonized and fully integrated. There is on the one hand Rostovtzeff the intuitive historian, loaded with presuppositions and prone to broad and dangerous generalizations, and there is on the other Rostovtzeff the learned and diligent scholar, true to the evidence, and the two seem not infrequently in conflict. Here I would simply like to select those aspects that relate to the present subject.

First, as regards Rostovtzeff's presentation of kings and royal government, what is striking is its impersonality. Rostovtzeff presents royal policies and aims in very generic and abstract terms. He credits kings in general with policies of organizing and integrating the territories under their rule and of developing their resources. The notion of rational, efficient planning is frequently invoked, and professionalism is alleged to be the hallmark of the governing class of the monarchies.[6] This conception is characteristic of a period when Greek 'rationality' was more easily taken for granted than it is now, and of an approach to history that underplayed personal factors. It leaves little place for the personalities and temperaments of individual kings, and for considerations of a psychological or irrational kind which may have motivated them.[7] Yet the monarchies were by definition personal regimes, and it seems therefore paradoxical to see them presented in such impersonal terms. What lies behind this approach, I believe, is an identification of the Hellenistic monarchies with national states such as those of nineteenth-century Europe, an identification which goes back, like so much in the modern study of the Hellenistic world, to J. G. Droysen, writing in the 1830s and 1840s, and has been very influential since, though it is now under challenge.

Secondly, Rostovtzeff seems to be working with a restrictive definition of the economy. In his view, the economy consists of productive economic processes, agriculture, trade, manufacture, credit, but does not include non-productive processes such as the phenomenon of war.[8] The economy is seen in nineteenth-century liberal terms as an autonomous sphere with a life of its own, which should best be left to its own devices and allowed to grow naturally without interference or disruption.

Thirdly, although war is a constant part of the scene, it is left largely unexplained as a kind of intrusive irrational force. Rostovtzeff is perfectly familiar with the importance of war as a mode of acquisition in the ancient world, as in i.195 'war in ancient times...was universally regarded as a method not only of settling political questions, but also of enriching the victors at the expense of the vanquished'. But the consequences of that conception are not followed up. It is symptomatic that in his general discussion of royal wealth and royal revenues, there is hardly any mention of revenues from war, though Rostovtzeff has some incidental evidence on this elsewhere.[9] The view that prevails is that of war as an intrusive, external force, purely

[5] See notably M. Reinhold, 'Historian of the Classic World: a Critique of Rostovtzeff', *Science and Society* 10 (1946), 361–91; A. Momigliano, *Contributo alla storia degli studi classici* (Rome, 1955), 335–9, 341–54.

[6] See Rostovtzeff i.248–50 (the monarchies in general), 267–74 (Ptolemies), 552f. and 564f. (minor monarchies), ii.703–5 (Antiochus IV), 1077–81 (royal government and governing class).

[7] Cf. Cl. Préaux, *Le Monde hellénistique* (Paris, 1978), i.339f.

[8] See Rostovtzeff's long survey ii.1134–1301, which has only a few pages on military industries (1232f., 1236), and nothing on war as part of economic life.

[9] ii.1150–4 (Ptolemies), 1155 (Seleucids). Apart from a longer passage in i.192–206, references to booty in Rostovtzeff are usually brief and frequently give no source references, cf. i.129f. (Alexander), 146 (Successors), 203f., 287, 326f., 414 (Ptolemies), ii.710, 1152 (Ptolemies).

destructive and negative, and never adequately explained.[10] To quote from the *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*:[11]

> The sound economic development [of the early Hellenistic period] was first stunted and then gradually atrophied... one of the main causes was the constant warfare which raged almost without interruption all over the Hellenistic world... The fact and the reasons for it are well known. From the economic point of view these endless wars gradually became a real calamity for the Greek world... It was not only that large tracts of land were devastated, cities pillaged, and their residents sold into slavery. Much more important was the fact that the wars forced the Hellenistic states, both great and small, to concentrate their efforts on military preparations ... and thus wasting enormous sums of money.

War is thus a kind of wicked and irrational *deus ex machina*, who impedes normal economic development and can somehow force states and rulers against their will to devote their resources to military preparations. Since royal government is viewed as rational in character, it cannot therefore be connected with a phenomenon that Rostovtzeff seems to regard as fundamentally irrational. The military nature of monarchy, which Rostovtzeff was well aware of,[12] and the consequences this had, have somehow been lost in the argument.

If one turns from Rostovtzeff's pre-war study to a much more recent work on the Hellenistic world, the new edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*,[13] the distance travelled since Rostovtzeff is of course vast and striking. One can think in terms of a pre-war and a post-war view of the Hellenistic world, or perhaps a colonial and a post-colonial view. Many of the conceptions of Rostovtzeff and others have been modified, challenged, or abandoned. The 'unity' of the Hellenistic world, which Rostovtzeff emphasized so much,[14] a view once more derived from Droysen,[15] seems to have disappeared altogether.[16] Where earlier scholarship stressed the innovative distinctiveness of the Hellenistic world, recent work emphasizes instead continuity with the past, both in the Greek and the eastern worlds, and challenges the very notion of a distinct Hellenistic world. As an example of the change of perspective, E. G. Turner's chapter on Ptolemaic Egypt reads like a flat rejection of the Rostovtzeff view:[17] for Rostovtzeff, Ptolemy II Philadelphus was the creator of the prosperity of Ptolemaic Egypt, while for Turner he is the ruler who set the dynasty on the wrong course altogether in his ruthless draining of the country's resources – a view which lurks in fact under the surface in Rostovtzeff, but is never brought out and taken to its logical conclusion.[18] Yet as regards the presentation of kings and war, the new work does not progress beyond Rostovtzeff's account as much as might have been expected. The organization of the book into specialized, separate aspects often has the result of obscuring interconnections between aspects that should be seen as related. The

[10] See for example i.23, 43, 189–206, ii.1242f. In i.143–52, writing of the Age of the Successors, Rostovtzeff concedes for once that war could occasionally have a beneficent aspect, by putting into circulation money hitherto dormant in the great Persian treasures and so stimulating economic development. This conception is derived from J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (Tübingen, 1952–3, from the 1877 edition), i.436–9; an obvious colonial analogy lurks beneath the surface.

[11] (2nd ed., Oxford. 1957), i.4.

[12] See Rostovtzeff i.430f. on the Seleucids, but the implications of that view are not pursued.

[13] Volume vii part 1 (Cambridge, 2nd ed. 1984).

[14] See Rostovtzeff iii.1746, index svv. unification, unity.

[15] Droysen, op. cit. (n. 10), i.442, iii.422.

[16] See especially the searching chapter (8) by J. K. Davies on 'Cultural, social and economic features of the Hellenistic world'.

[17] Chapter 5.

[18] Cf. Reinhold (n. 5), 372–6.

chapter on monarchies and monarchical ideas starts from the military origins and nature of the monarchies, yet does not bring out the consequences of this for political and economic history in general.[19] The connection between royalty and wealth is noted, but not explained, and its implications are not explored.[20] Other chapters in the book relate in detail the political and military history of various parts and periods of the Hellenistic world, and the record is inevitably one of more or less incessant warfare. But why this should be so is hardly made clear in these chapters,[21] and one often has the feeling of reading a story without an explanation, or with only half an explanation. The chapter on war and siegecraft[22] is written from a purely technical point of view, apart from the last two sentences, and does not seek to explain the phenomenon of war in the Hellenistic world, though the author of the chapter, Yvon Garlan, could be expected to have a great deal to say on the subject.

I should hasten to add that the volume as a whole is of high quality and has many excellent individual contributions, but the separation of topics that should be related is worrying and characteristic of prevailing approaches. There is no lack of detailed modern studies of warfare in the Hellenistic world, but they are of a predominantly technical kind, about weapons, tactics, equipment, recruitment of troops, conditions of service, and so forth, rather than studies and explanations of the phenomenon of war as such. There is no lack either of studies of particular wars and campaigns, or of the reigns of individual rulers and their policies, but these are again treated as belonging to an independent, self-contained and self-explanatory sphere.[23] A large dimension seems to be missing. Now the study of ancient war as part of ancient society and its institutions has progressed a great deal in recent years, and the effects of this approach on, for example, the study of Roman Republican history are a matter of considerable current debate. But so far the Hellenistic world seems to have been largely bypassed in this respect, even by those who have been most active in promoting a new approach to the study of war in antiquity. Yvon Garlan's suggestive though often tantalizing *War in the Ancient World. A Social History*[24] has little to say about Hellenistic kings specifically. The volume on *Imperialism in the Ancient World* edited by P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker[25] only includes one chapter on the political relations between the Antigonids of Macedon and the Greek states, and nothing on any of the other monarchies.[26] W. K. Pritchett's pioneering and invaluable series of studies entitled *The Greek State at War*[27] is largely concerned with the world of the cities and contains no systematic treatment of Hellenistic kings. An article by Sir Moses Finley on 'War and Empire' published in a recent collection of essays[28] criticizes prevailing trends in the study of ancient wars and calls for a reevaluation of the acquisitive motive in those wars, but save for one passing allusion to Philip of Macedon (p. 76) does not discuss the considerable role of Hellenistic kings in the

[19] F. W. Walbank, chapter 3, 63, 66, 81f.

[20] Id. 84.

[21] Davies (n. 16), 291 gives a clear characterization of the competitiveness and military nature of the monarchies, but refers back to Walbank's chapter without further discussion.

[22] Chapter 9(b).

[23] Bibliographies on all aspects of Hellenistic history may be found in Préaux (n. 7), Ed. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique*, 2 vols. (2nd ed., Nancy, 1979 and 1982), and the new *Cambridge Ancient History* vii.1.

[24] London, 1975.

[25] Cambridge, 1978.

[26] Cf. F. Millar, *CR* 30 (1980), 83–6.

[27] Berkeley & Los Angeles, i (1971), ii (1974), iii (1979), iv (1986).

[28] M. I. Finley, *Ancient History. Models and Evidence* (London, 1985), 67–87.

story. Among modern writers, few have explicitly sought to integrate war into the study of Hellenistic history. I single out as exceptions E. J. Bikerman's outstanding *Institutions des Séleucides*,[29] a short but suggestive article by P. Lévêque,[30] and especially the work of Claire Préaux,[31] perhaps the greatest of post-Rostovtzeff historians of the Hellenistic world. My debt to all these and to others will be obvious. But as yet there is to my knowledge no equivalent for Hellenistic kings to the study of Roman emperors as military figures such has now been provided by J. B. Campbell.[32]

II

This widespread neglect seems at first sight rather surprising. After all, in so far as one can talk of the Hellenistic world as coming into being at a particular point of time, it did so as the result of a massive and deliberate military conquest, undertaken openly for acquisitive purposes. The Macedonian invasion of Asia represented the belated fulfilment of an old Greek idea, which finds its first literary expression not in the fourth century but in Herodotus, when in the context of the outbreak of the Ionian revolt in 499, Aristagoras of Miletus visits Sparta in search for allies and is made to dangle prospects of lucrative conquests in Asia before the eyes of Cleomenes of Sparta.[33]

> The inhabitants of Asia possess more wealth than the rest of mankind put together, starting with gold; silver, bronze, fine embroidered clothes, beasts of burden, and slaves – these are yours if you want them... There is Susa, where the Great King has his residence, and where he stores his treasures. Should you capture that city, you could fearlessly rival the wealth of Zeus. You fight wars over a small area of land, and of poor quality, with your rivals the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argives, who have nothing in the way of gold or silver that are worth fighting and dying for. Why not put these off? You have the chance of an easy conquest of the whole of Asia. Is there any choice between the two?

The Macedonian conquest under Alexander can be described as two things rolled into one, a booty raid on an epic scale and the permanent conquest of vast tracts of territory together with dependent, tributary peoples. On both counts the expedition probably surpasses or at least equals any other single war in the whole of ancient history. The sources quote fabulous figures for the captured Persian treasures, 50000 talents of silver from Susa, 120000 from Persepolis,[34] and they also comment on the effects of all this on Alexander's followers and the startling jump in their standard of living.[35] And that of course was what the expedition was all about. It is striking

[29] Paris, 1938.

[30] P. Lévêque, 'La Guerre à l'époque hellénistique', in *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne*, ed. J. P. Vernant (Paris & The Hague, 1968), 261–87.

[31] Cl. Préaux, *Third International Conference of Economic History* (Paris & The Hague, 1969), iii,41–74; op. cit. (n. 7), i.183–201, 295–357, 366–70.

[32] J. B. Campbell, *The Emperor and the Roman Army 31 B.C.–A.D. 235* (Oxford, 1984); see also F. Millar, 'Emperors, Frontiers, and Foreign Relations, 31 B.C. to A.D. 378'. *Britannia* 13 (1982), 1–23. There is disappointingly little analysis in W. S. Ferguson, *Greek Imperialism* (London, 1913), and, less surprisingly, in C. Schneider, *Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1967, 1969), which dissociates cultural history from social analysis.

[33] 5.49.

[34] See the collection of material in H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich, 1926), i.173f., 304f., 312f.; P. Ducrey, *Le Traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique* (Paris, 1968), 159–70. The subject receives no systematic discussion in D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1978), which has only a few incidental references to pillaging, pp. 72, 77, 120.

[35] For example Plutarch, *Alexander* 39–40.

that in all the profusion of Alexander scholarship, attention is diffused in many directions, about source problems, military organization, the tactics of the battles, political aspects of Alexander's reign, Alexander's personality, his ideas, plans for the future, and so on, yet the original purpose of the expedition is often passed over.

If the Macedonian invasion of Asia was possibly the largest plundering and conquering expedition of its kind in ancient history, then the Age of the Successors can also be seen as another record, as the most bitter and prolonged dispute over sharing out the spoils of victory between the conquerors, a struggle that went on for a generation or more and affected virtually the entire Greek and Asiatic world of the time. From the point of view of the Macedonian leaders, their struggle was not without justification. Modern terminology describes the conquest of Asia as being Alexander's, whereas for the ancient sources it was a Macedonian enterprise.[36] Why should the Macedonian leaders not fight over what they felt justified in regarding as theirs by right of conquest? That is how the conflict is presented in the ancient sources. Individual leaders fought wars, made and unmade treaties, with and against each other, over who was going to get what. To quote at random from the narrative of Diodorus:[37]

> While Antigonus the One-Eyed was going into Upper Syria [in 316], envoys arrived from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander... They demanded that Cappadocia and Lycia be given to Cassander, Hellespontine Phrygia to Lysimachus, all Syria to Ptolemy, and Babylonia to Seleucus, and that Antigonus should divide the treasures that he had captured after the battle with Eumenes, since they too had a share in the war.

Although the dispute reached a settlement of sorts with the eventual emergence of three powerful dynasties, which controlled between them a significant part of the world of the time, it remained in a sense permanently unresolved, or at least only half-resolved, a point that has frequently been obscured in modern writings. From Droysen onwards, many historians, including Rostovtzeff, presented the political history of the third century after the Age of the Successors as being characterized by a 'balance of power'.[38] An equilibrium of sorts was achieved, it is suggested, and the different 'states' curtailed their ambitions and accepted each other's existence, de facto or perhaps even as a matter of conscious policy. This conception has long dominated and influenced modern views of the third century though it has rightly been challenged,[39] and one looks forward to its eventual disappearance. It is a patent anachronism, artificially injected into Hellenistic history on the analogy of the history of nineteenth-century Europe. It is simply one more example of the identification of the Hellenistic world with the world of modern Europe in the age of its colonial empires, an identification that was deliberate and conscious from Droysen onwards.[40] As W. W. Tarn put it in 1911, 'No part of Greek history should come home to us like the third century B.C. It is the only period that we can in the least compare with our own; indeed in some ways it is quite startlingly modern'. And discussing various

[36] R. M. Errington, *Entretiens Hardt* XXII (Geneva, 1976), 158f.

[37] 19.57.1.

[38] E.g. Droysen (n. 10), iii.182; Rostovtzeff (n. 4), i.23f., 47, 552f., ii.1026–9 and *passim*; more recently P. Klose, *Die Völkerrechtliche Ordnung der hellenistischen Staatenwelt in der Zeit von 280 bis 168 v.Chr.* (Munich, 1972), 91f.

[39] See H. H. Schmitt, 'Polybius und das Gleichgewicht der Mächte', *Entretiens Hardt* XX (1974), with discussion 94–102; Ed. Will (n. 23), i.154f. and *Revue Historique* 522 (1977), 401–6 (critique of Klose); *CAH* vii.1 (n. 13), 81, 419f., 445.

[40] See e.g. the explicit parallels and contrasts drawn between Hellenistic and contemporary European colonization in Droysen's excursus on the foundations of Alexander and his Successors, iii.429–34.

features of the third century which he identifies as modern, Tarn goes on to say 'The balance of power has become a reality and a preoccupation'.[41] Hellenistic monarchies are thus seen as in some ways replicas of modern nation-states, pursuing the same kind of policies, and kings are turned into incarnations of the impersonal state, as we have seen in Rostovtzeff's presentation. The vocabulary of statehood seems to dominate our historical thinking. As regards the Hellenistic world, historians talk of the emergence of a 'system of states' after the Age of the Successors,[42] and of Hellenistic monarchies it is said that 'the king was the state' or 'the king represented the state'.[43] I wonder how exactly this would translate into Greek. It is by no means obvious that Hellenistic monarchies should be described as 'states'. They were in the first instance dynasties, personal régimes, exceptional no doubt in the scale of their power and wealth, and in their duration, but personal régimes all the same, with all the consequences this had.[44] In these monarchies, policy decisions rested with the individual ruler interacting with his closest followers, and the ruler was subject by definition to personal pressures and considerations.

As regards the time after the Age of the Successors, it is of course true that some qualitative change did take place. From a completely open-ended and unpredictable struggle, three major dynasties did manage to establish themselves and proved to be lasting, and this necessarily had major consequences for many aspects of Hellenistic history. They established themselves territorially, imported manpower from the Greek world, fixed it in the lands they controlled, and built cities. Having done this, they then had to retain control of those territories and defend them. Although initially divorced from any specific territorial setting, and thus mobile and fluid, the monarchies acquired a sedentary character. But the contrast with the Age of the Successors should not be pushed too far. In a sense, the Age of the Successors never really came to an end, until the coming of the Romans gradually changed the rules of the game and eventually did away with the leading monarchies altogether. The ideology of conquest remained intermittently potent, depending on rulers and circumstances. Obvious examples are Pyrrhus of Epirus in the west, Ptolemy III's grandiloquent presentation of the 'Third Syrian War' in the Adulis inscription,[45] most of the reign of Antiochus III around the four corners of Asia and onto the European mainland as well, and Antiochus IV's invasion of Egypt.[46] Philip V of Macedon, according to Polybius, sought constantly to emphasize his (alleged) connection with Philip and Alexander, and is credited with ambitions of universal rule, which, says Polybius, ran in his family.[47] The statement is a cause of embarrassment to some modern writers,[48] but what matters is that Polybius believed it. One might also adduce an epigram by the poet Alcaeus of Messene, a contemporary and enemy of Philip V, in which he advises Zeus and the gods to barricade themselves in heaven: Philip has conquered the land and the sea, he will stop at nothing and his next target is going to be Olympus![49] Then

[41] W. W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* (Oxford, 1913), 1f.

[42] E.g. Ed. Will, *CAH* vii.1 (n. 13), 61; the formulation goes back to Droysen iii.182.

[43] E.g. Walbank, *CAH* vii.1.65, 71; L. Mooren (n. 67 below), 231f. (though excepting Macedon).

[44] Cf. *Entretiens Hardt* (n. 39), 98f.

[45] *OGIS* 54.

[46] See n. 90 below.

[47] Polybius 5.10, 101–2, 104.7, 108.5, 15.24.6.

[48] E.g. Klose (n. 38), 87f.; the allegation is brushed aside by Will (n. 23), ii.76, 79f. For a good view of the steady growth of Antigonid power, see K. Buraselis, *Das Hellenistische Makedonien und die Ägäis* (Munich, 1982), 177–9.

[49] *Anth. Pal.* 9.518.

there is the famous and much discussed 'secret pact' whereby Philip V and Antiochus III allegedly agreed in 203/2 to partition the territories of Ptolemy V.[50] Polybius was shocked (he often was), but he did not reject the notion as incredible, nor did he see it as a violation of a hypothetical 'balance of power', observed tacitly or openly by the kings.[51] At the far end of the Hellenistic world, the Greek rulers of Bactria, not content with achieving their independence from the Seleucids, crossed the Hindu Kush in the second century and undertook spectacular conquests to the east, and according to Strabo 'subdued more peoples than Alexander did'.[52] To the end, the Hellenistic world remained chaotic and unstable; if one may adapt the words of Sir Ronald Syme, Dynamis and Tyche were the presiding divinities.

III

All this ties in with the view of the king as a military figure, and the links between wealth and military power to which I must now turn. In Greek thought, monarchical power was associated with great personalities and great achievements, and these notions had a very long history well before the Hellenistic period.[53] To give but one example, in Hesiod's *Theogony* Zeus and the other gods overcome Cronos and the Titans in war, and so Zeus in his turn becomes *basileus* on Olympus in succession to his father Cronos.[54] The conception is strikingly reminiscent of the notions seen at work in the time of Alexander and after. In every case for which we have specific evidence, the title and status of a *basileus* was acquired in a military context after a victory in battle. Alexander had reportedly challenged Darius III over who was rightfully king: 'If you wish to lay claim to the title of king, then stand your ground and fight for it'.[55] After the battle of Gaugamela, Plutarch reports, Alexander was proclaimed *basileus* of Asia.[56] In 306 it was Demetrius' victory over Ptolemy in Cyprus that provided the pretext and the occasion for the joint assumption of the royal title by Antigonus and Demetrius.[57] Much later, in *c.* 238/7, Attalus of Pergamum assumed the title on defeating Antiochus Hierax and the Galatians.[58] All this had obvious implications. If royal status was achieved through struggle and victory, it would have to be maintained through continued success in war. If royal status could be acquired by an individual from scratch, the example could be imitated by others, and where exactly did the process stop? One way to interpret the political history of the period after 306 is to see it as a struggle by those who had achieved royal status, partly to hold on to that status, to all its perquisites, and to the territories they controlled, and partly to keep the membership of what one might call the 'royal club' as restricted as possible. There was never any lack of potential candidates, inside and outside the existing royal dynasties. Hence the pressure on kings to be and to remain successful military figures, and to be seen as such. This does not mean, of

[50] Polybius 15.20; for modern views see Walbank's Commentary and Will (n. 23), ii.114–18.
[51] Cf. H. H. Schmitt (n. 39), 91 n. 1.
[52] 11.11.1; see Will (n. 23), ii.348–52.
[53] See M. Delcourt, *Oedipe ou la légende du conquérant* (Liège & Paris, 1944).
[54] Lines 71–3, cf. 461f., 476, 486.
[55] Arrian 2.14.
[56] Plutarch, *Alexander* 34.
[57] Plutarch, *Demetrius* 18; Diodorus 20.53.1–4.
[58] Polybius 18.41; for the connection between military victory and royal status, see also e.g. Diodorus 19.48.1 and 55.2 (Antigonus), 93.4 (Demetrius), 105.4 (the leading Successors), 20.79.2 (Agathocles); Polybius 1.9.8 (Hiero II), 10.38.3 and 40.2 (Scipio Africanus), 11.34.16 (Antiochus III).

course, that all Hellenistic kings were simply war leaders and nothing else. Plutarch's characterization of Pyrrhus, for example, shows this: 'He devoted all his practice and study to the art of war, which he thought the most royal of sciences'[59] – the most royal, not the only royal science. But all Hellenistic kings had to be in part war leaders, and most actually were so. The wearing of Macedonian military dress remained normal practice with all kings till the last of the Ptolemies.[60] The vast majority of kings fought conspicuously at the head of their troops. This was true of Philip, Alexander, and all the Successors, and it remained true of all subsequent kings except for the Ptolemies after Ptolemy IV.[61] The sight of the king's person in battle was always assumed to have a decisive psychological effect on his troops.[62] In their presentation of themselves, the kings stressed their military virtues and achievements, and sought to establish a royal monopoly of military glory. Their coinage emphasized these themes, and arrogated Victory personified as a personal attribute of the ruler. The rulers described themselves as the Victorious, the Invincible, especially the Seleucids and the rulers of Bactria.[63]

A comparison between Hellenistic rulers and the world of the classical polis is instructive here. Characteristic of the classical polis, as Pritchett has argued, was its phobia of successful generals and its determination to keep them under strict political control, and that control seems generally to have been maintained right down to the fourth century.[64] In the fifth century, the glory of victory belonged not to the individual general, but was jealously guarded by the collective body of the citizens. The career of Pausanias of Sparta after the Persian Wars is an illustration of this,[65] while Plutarch notes of Cimon that it was an exceptional honour for the Athenians to allow him to set up three stone statues with dedications to commemorate his victories over the Persians, but his name did not appear in the dedications.[66] One might also adduce the Athenian institution of the *Epitaphios* and the public burial of the war dead. In the Hellenistic monarchies, by contrast, there was no collective body to fetter the king's decisions over war and its conduct, not even in Macedon.[67] The glory of victory belonged to the king himself, usually exclusively, except when a king acted together with allies whose contribution had to be acknowledged.[68] The victory dedications of Attalus I at Pergamum illustrate this: the victories are those of Attalus personally, not Attalus and a collective body, such as his army.[69] Similarly the grandiloquent account by Ptolemy III of his march into Asia during the 'Third Syrian War', the so-called Adulis inscription, presents the campaign as a grand conquering

[59] Plutarch, *Pyrrhus* 8.

[60] Plutarch, *Antony* 54.

[61] Préaux (n. 7), i.195–8; for the Seleucids cf. B. Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army* (Cambridge, 1976), 85f.

[62] See e.g. Polybius 5.41.7–9, 45.6, 54.1 (Antiochus III), 85.8 (Ptolemy IV).

[63] See briefly Lévêque (n. 30), 276–9; G. C. Picard, *Les Trophées romains* (Paris, 1957), 64–100 for victory monuments.

[64] Pritchett (n. 27), ii chs. 1–3.

[65] Thucydides 1.128–34, esp. 132.2f.

[66] Plutarch, *Cimon* 7–8.

[67] This remains true even if the existence of a collective body of 'Macedonians' with limited public functions is attested from the latter part of the reign of Antigonus Gonatas; see F. Papazoglou, 'Sur l'organisation de la Macédoine des Antigonides'. *Ancient Macedonia* (Thessalonica, 1983), iii.195–210; L. Mooren, 'The Nature of the Hellenistic Monarchy', in *Egypt and the Hellenistic World* (Louvain, 1983), 205–40.

[68] E.g. the dedication for the battle of Sellasia in 222, *Syll.*[3] 518.

[69] *OGIS* 273–9.

expedition, conducted by the king personally, his anonymous army following obediently.[70]

In short, the concentration of the military function on the king himself had as consequence the ruler's need to maintain and develop his aura of military success. Royalty was associated with strength; a weak king was a contradiction in terms. Lurking under the surface was the danger for a king of falling into contempt and so becoming the object of attack. Aristotle identified contempt as one of the causes of the overthrow of monarchies.[71] Compare what Isocrates says of Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus: under the rule of Evagoras, Salamis came to be viewed with fear rather than contempt.[72] The notion is one that occurs with remarkable frequency in political and military contexts in ancient sources, and notably in relation to Hellenistic rulers. The danger was particularly acute with rulers who came to power at a young age, without having proved themselves before.[73] It is no accident that it should often be precisely such young rulers who turn out to be among the most restless and enterprising kings. Alexander the Great, Antiochus III, and Philip V are all obvious examples.

No less important was the ruler's view of himself in relation to the achievements of his predecessors in the dynasty. It was generally assumed that kings were mindful of their ancestors and their achievements, and regarded their power and possessions as a family inheritance that must, according to circumstances, be preserved, rebuilt, or even enlarged.[74] We have seen how Philip V, according to Polybius, stressed his connection with Philip and Alexander, and aimed at universal rule in conformity with an Antigonid family tradition. At the battle of Raphia in 217, Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV both harangued their troops, as was common for rulers before battles. To quote Polybius: 'Neither monarch had any glorious or famous achievement of his own to quote... seeing that they had but recently come to power. But they endeavoured to inspire the men of the phalanx with spirit and boldness, by reminding them of the glory of their ancestors, and the deeds performed by them'.[75]

IV

So far I have said little about the economy, and it is time to bring in this aspect too. If kings were by definition associated with strength and military glory, they were also associated with wealth. A king was assumed to be wealthy, and to be a giver as well as a receiver of wealth: a poor king or a stingy king was felt to be a contradiction in terms.[76] Polybius' well-known digression on the donations of cities and kings to the island of Rhodes after the earthquake of 227/6 was prompted in part by his desire to stigmatize the meanness of some contemporary rulers by contrast with the

[70] *OGIS* 54.

[71] Aristotle, *Politics* 1311b40–1312a20; cf. J. Wallace-Hadrill, *JRS* 72 (1982), 33-5, though he does not discuss the military aspect.

[72] Isocrates, *Evagoras* 47.

[73] See for example Diodorus 18.9.2 (Leosthenes), 17.1 (Antipater), 60.1 (Eumenes), 74.1 (Polyperchon), 20.77.2 (Agathocles); Polybius 4.22.5, 5.16.2, 18.6, 26.4, 29.2, 34.2 (Philip V), 5.1.7 and 30.1 (Eperatus, an Achaean general), 5.34.2 and 41.1 (Antiochus III), 7.3.6f. (Hieronymus son of Hiero II); further examples in A. Mauersberger, *Polybius-Lexicon* svv. καταφρονεῖν, καταφρονήσις; Livy 42.29.5–7 and Josephus, *AJ* 12.242 (Ptolemy VI).

[74] See for example Theocritus 17.104f., Polybius 5.34 (Ptolemies); *OGIS* 219, lines 7f., I *Maccabees* 15.3 (Seleucids).

[75] 5.83.

[76] Préaux (n. 7), i.208–10.

open-handed generosity, as he saw it, of an earlier generation.[77] The connection between royalty and wealth is a potentially vast subject with many ramifications which cannot be pursued here. I merely want to trace connections between royal wealth and royal military power. This links up with Sir Moses Finley's observation that the most prosperous states in antiquity were conquest states, which owed much of their prosperity to their superior military power and the fruits of it.[78] The general principle is put succinctly by Yvon Garlan:

> Most conflicts between organized states were simultaneously economic and political in character: exploitation and subjection were synonymous. In the ancient world power and wealth were not independent notions; each fed on the other... power was used to seize wealth... wealth was seized in order to enhance power.[79]

For a more specific application of the principle, with obvious relevance to Hellenistic kings, we may turn to Julius Caesar, who could speak with some authority on the matter: 'There were two things which created, preserved, and increased dominations (*dynasteias*), soldiers and money, and these two were dependent on each other'.[80] Hellenistic rulers, and many others before, had long been acting on precisely that principle. The Age of the Successors, as narrated by Diodorus, gives a rich crop of examples. For instance, he says of Antigonus the One-Eyed, after the death of Antipater in 317,

> He assumed that since he had a better army, he would gain possession of the treasures of Asia... in addition [to the troops he already had, some 60000 infantry, 10000 cavalry, and 30 elephants], he expected to be able to enrol more if necessary, since Asia could provide unlimited pay for the mercenaries he might muster.[81]

Later, Antigonus' annual revenue is given as 11000 talents: 'As a result, he was a formidable opponent both because of the size of his armies and because of the amount of his wealth'.[82] The wealth of the Ptolemies is a recurring theme in Hellenistic literature; the point of interest is that ancient sources regularly link their wealth and their military power. 'Prosperity attends [Ptolemy Philadelphus] in abundance, and vast is the territory he rules, and vast the sea', says Theocritus,[83] and the poem then goes on to elaborate both points. Similarly the great procession organized by Philadelphus at Alexandria in 271/0 with maximum publicity was, as described by Athenaeus from a contemporary source, a display both of wealth and of military power.[84] The same applies to the great pageant staged with equally ostentatious publicity by Antiochus IV at Daphne in 166; Polybius explicitly states that much of the wealth on show came from Antiochus' recent wars against Egypt.[85] Their wealth enabled the kings to become the chief employers of troops, and as well as booty from war, their armies enabled them to acquire, control, and sometimes enlarge tributary territories and peoples, from which they could finance in turn their military power.

[77] 5.88–90.

[78] *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1983), 61–4, 109–16; *The Ancient Economy* (2nd ed., London, 1985), 204–7.

[79] *War in the Ancient World* (London, 1975), 183.

[80] Dio 42.49.4.

[81] 18.50.2f.

[82] 19.56.5; for other instances see **18**.16.2, 19.2, 53.2, 55.2; **19**.56.2, 72.1, 78.1.

[83] Theocritus 17.75f.

[84] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 5.196a–203e (from Callixeinus of Rhodes, *FGrHist* 627 F 1–2); see E. E. Rice, *The Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus* (Oxford, 1983), on which cf. F. W. Walbank, *LCM* 9.4 (1984), 52–4.

[85] Polybius 30.25–6; the purpose of the pageant has been much discussed, most recently by J. G. Bunge, *Chiron* 6 (1976), 53–71. Polybius' description is surely self-explanatory.

Increase of territory meant increase of revenues hence of power, while decrease of territory had the opposite effect and might send the dynasty into a spiral of decline. The history of every dynasty could be used to illustrate the point. This suggests that the notion of conquest may need to be applied in a more flexible way than has sometimes been the case. A contrast has frequently been drawn between the time of Alexander, the period of open-ended conquest, and the time after that, when supposedly the idea of conquest was dropped,[86] the established dynasties accepted each other's existence and fought only limited wars over disputed zones.[87] But the notion of fixed, stable frontiers is one that is alien to the world of the kings, and it is perhaps no accident that so little is known of treaties made at the conclusion of wars between kings, which may therefore have been conceived as temporary truces without any long-term commitments.[88] We have already seen that the idea of open-ended conquest did not in fact disappear altogether. And the significance of the many wars between the monarchies over disputed territories should not be minimized. For instance, the Seleucids and Ptolemies fought an almost unending series of wars for over a century over the control of Coele Syria, a large expanse of territory of great wealth and strategic significance. From the point of view of the Seleucids this was no mere frontier dispute, but territory that had to be conquered from the Ptolemies, for strategic and economic reasons, as well as for reasons of prestige.[89] Antiochus III eventually succeeded at the end of the third century, but not surprisingly the conflict flared up again in the late 170s. The Ptolemies never relinquished their claim to the lost territories, as the reign of Cleopatra VII was to show as late as the 30s B.C., and it seems that the initiative in the conflict was taken by the Ptolemaic side, though in truth both sides seem to have desired the war, for openly acquisitive reasons.[90] The sequel to this was two invasions of Egypt by Antiochus IV in 170–168, which produced a vast haul of booty,[91] and during which Antiochus seems to have aimed at the takeover of Egypt pure and simple. All of this was surely not unconnected with the fact that, by the Peace of Apamea in 188, the Romans not only inflicted a heavy war indemnity on the Seleucids, but also drastically reduced their territory by expelling them from Asia Minor. The wars of Antiochus IV in Syria and in Egypt were surely his response to that.[92]

V

Up till now I have concentrated on the kings themselves, but it is becoming apparent that any discussion of royal policies and actions cannot in practice be restricted merely

[86] For example C. Bradford-Welles, *Greece and Rome* 12.2 (1965), 220f.

[87] See n. 42 above.

[88] A glance at H. H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, III: *Die Staatsverträge von 338 bis 200 v.Chr.* (Munich, 1969), is enough to show the paucity of known treaties between kings as opposed to treaties involving constitutional entities such as cities or leagues. For an example of a treaty between kings into which modern scholarship has read far more than the limited evidence allows (the treaty between Antigonus Gonatas and Antiochus I in *c.* 278), see Buraselis (n. 48), 110, 115–19.

[89] A point not brought out in Polybius' account of the 'Fourth Syrian War' in Book 5, cf. P. Pédech, *La Méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris, 1964), 141.

[90] Cf. Livy 42.29.5–7, Josephus, *AJ* 12.242 (citing several Greek sources); Diodorus 30.16 even credits Ptolemy's ministers with the ambition of conquering the whole of Antiochus IV's realm. On the conflict cf. O. Mørkholm, *Antiochus IV of Syria* (Copenhagen, 1966), chs. 4–5 and Will (n. 23), ii.311–25, though neither brings out sufficiently the acquisitive motives involved.

[91] See n. 85.

[92] II *Maccabees* 8.9–10 explicitly connects the sale of Jewish war captives by a Seleucid general with the need to pay the Romans.

to the kings. Evidently, the character of the monarchies was determined not just by the rulers themselves, but also by their followings. A king was a leader, and could only become and remain a leader so long as he had followers. Thus the need to acquire and retain that following inevitably influenced royal policies. What that following consisted of is easily stated. In human terms, the nucleus of a monarchy was made up of the king, his 'friends' (*philoi*), and his military forces. The point could be applied to Philip and Alexander, who both grew great by developing their personal following and their military forces, and providing them with lucrative military objectives. Alexander's sudden death in 323 changed the circumstances, but the formula remained valid and could now be applied freely by a series of other leaders, and they lost no time in imitating the example they had benefited from. For instance, Diodorus says of Ptolemy in 323 'he took over Egypt without difficulty... finding 8000 talents in the treasury he began to collect mercenaries and to form an army. A multitude of friends also gathered about him'.[93] The phrase 'king, friends, army' soon became quasi-technical and official in character. It is first found as an established concept in a pair of inscriptions of about 286/5 relating to Lysimachus and the city of Priene: Priene sends an embassy to congratulate Lysimachus 'on the good health he and his friends enjoyed and on the sound condition of his military forces'.[94] The phrase also occurs in inscriptions relating to the Seleucids[95] and to the Attalids,[96] in every case in the context of relations between a king and a Greek city.

(*a*) *The king's 'friends'*

The institution of the royal 'friends' has been well studied.[97] It was common to all the monarchies, which in practice could not have functioned without them. The kings recruited their 'friends' on a personal basis, and the friends provided the rulers with officers, governors, administrators, ambassadors, attendants at court, and companions in action who shared the king's life. Two points should be made here. First, the relationship between king and friend was ambivalent and potentially unstable. It was based supposedly on trust and loyalty,[98] and there are indeed cases both of kings and of friends who remained loyal to each other even in adversity. But the very emphasis placed on loyalty by both sides hints at an underlying insecurity. It is a commonplace in Greek literature that kings could not be trusted and that their friends lived dangerously; kings did harm.[99] But one could add that from a king's point of view, his friends were equally a source of potential danger. Friends might desert a king for a rival ruler; they might threaten the authority and even the very position of the king, a theme which runs through much of Seleucid history. Second, the real basis of the

[93] 18.14.1.

[94] *OGIS* 11, lines 10f.; C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (New Haven & London, 1934), no. 6 lines 6f. The Prieneans had in fact omitted to mention the 'friends' and were corrected on this point by Lysimachus. On Lysimachus see also Diodorus 21.12.1 (in 292).

[95] *OGIS* 219; P. Herrman, *Anadolu* 9 (1965), 34–6 lines 23f.

[96] *Inschriften von Magnesia* 86 line 17. See also in general Polybius 5.50.9.

[97] See especially Bikerman (n. 29), 31–50; Ch. Habicht, 'Die herrschende Gesellschaft in den hellenistischen Monarchien', *Vierteljahrschrift für Soziologie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 45 (1958), 1–16; Préaux (n. 7), i.200, 212–30; G. Herman, 'The "Friends" of the Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials?', *Talanta* (1981), 103–49; Walbank, *CAH* vii.1 (n. 13), 68–71.

[98] For this theme see e.g. Diodorus 21.12.1 (Lysimachus); C. B. Welles (n. 94) nos. 11–12 (Antiochus I), no. 44 (Antiochus III), no. 45 (Seleucus IV); Polybius 18.41 (Attalus I).

[99] Polybius 5.26, contrast 7.8 (Hiero II): cf. F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World* (London, 1977), 110–22.

relationship, from the point of view of the friends of the king, was material rewards in return for services performed. A friend of a king would join that king in the expectation of receiving wealth and power. A king's friend was assumed to be a wealthy person because of his position. There is abundant evidence for this, as for example a very instructive chapter in Plutarch,[100] which relates how Alexander sent the Athenian Phocion a present of 100 talents no less. Alexander's envoys, on seeing Phocion's modest lifestyle 'exclaimed that it was monstrous that Phocion, who was an honoured friend of the king, should live in such poverty'. Phocion nevertheless refused the present, and Alexander's reaction was that 'he did not consider those who refused to accept anything from him to be his friends'. All the same, he later went on to offer him the revenues of a city of his choice from among four in Asia Minor. It is obvious therefore that the ideal of the generous king had a very practical basis in reality: a king was expected to deliver the goods, above all to his followers. Hence the economic rapacity of the kings, consumers of wealth on an unending scale; they had to be prosperous and successful, otherwise their following might melt away and their power crumble. There are numerous examples of this in the Age of the Successors. The struggle for power was in part a struggle to attract and retain a following at the expense of rivals. Changes of side were frequent.[101] After this period there appears to have been some stabilization in the recruitment of royal friends, but the competition for their services never totally came to an end, as shown by the case of one Alexander of Acarnania mentioned by Livy: 'He had once been a friend of Philip V, but he had lately deserted him [some time before 193] and attached himself to the more prosperous court of Antiochus III'.[102] Once again, success and wealth were the decisive elements.

(*b*) *The king's military forces*

The same applies in general to the king in relation to his military forces. Much has been written on the subject of Hellenistic armies and Hellenistic warfare,[103] yet the question of the interaction of king and army is a neglected one. Neglected too is the relationship between kings and subordinate holders of military authority;[104] in practice kings had to delegate military authority to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the extent of the territories under their rule. There was thus a potential contradiction between the king's theoretical monopoly of the military function and military glory, and practical circumstances, and this had obvious risks for the king's own position. The following remarks are necessarily provisional and liable to expansion and modification.

As regards the evolution over the period as a whole, and leaving aside the reigns of Philip and Alexander, there is obviously a distinction between the Age of the

[100] *Phocion* 18. Cf. Berve (n. 34), ii no. 816.

[101] See for example Diodorus 18.14.1, 28.5–6, 19.86 (Ptolemy); 18.33–6 (Perdiccas and Ptolemy); 18.50, 53, 61–2, 19.25 (Antigonus and Eumenes); Plutarch, *Demetrius* 49–50 (Seleucus and Demetrius).

[102] Livy 35.18.1; cf. also the competition between rival Seleucid rulers for the favour of Jonathan (Bikerman (n. 29), 44).

[103] For a recent survey cf. Garlan (n. 22).

[104] H. Bengtson, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1937 (repr. 1964), 1944, 1952) discusses the subject from a largely administrative point of view, with only incidental recognition of the problem of delegated military authority (ii.56–60, on the Seleucids); the resulting picture is much too tidy and impersonal, cf. his concluding survey in iii.190–6. Against see A. Aymard, 'Esprit militaire et administration hellénistique', *Études d'histoire ancienne* (Paris, 1967), 461–73.

Successors and the time after that. The years after Alexander's death were characterized by the large scale availability of mercenaries looking for any suitable employment, together with a profusion of ambitious leaders anxious to carve out a position for themselves. Hence the proliferation of armies and petty warlords, which resulted in an extraordinarily fluid and unstable situation, with whole armies changing sides, depending on the issue of battle and the prospects of more lucrative service.[105] Thereafter, with the emergence of a few major dynasties, a limited stabilization took place. In practice, these were the men who through success in war had emerged as the most dependable employers, who were able to recruit armies on a very large scale, amounting in major campaigns to tens of thousands of troops. But they could never corner the market, and were themselves in competition with each other.

Concerning the composition of royal armies, while the methods of recruitment and terms of service varied according to the dynasties and to circumstances, one element common to these armies was that they were substantially 'professional' in character, made up of men whose livelihood was partly or wholly war, and they always included a mercenary element. This had as important consequence the virtual absence of the phenomenon of war-weariness that had always been liable to afflict the citizen armies of the polis world, for whom war, in addition to its hardships, took citizens away from other occupations.

What, then, motivated armies? Not an interest in policy decisions, which were left to the king. Although the development of corporate associations of soldiers was characteristic of the age, as shown by the proliferation of dedications made by these associations, they did not develop into independent decision-making bodies.[106] There is some evidence for the growth of dynastic loyalty towards established dynasties on the part of troops in regular royal employment,[107] and oaths of personal loyalty to the king may have been a regular institution.[108] In practice, unquestioning loyalty could never be taken for granted, and the theme of insubordination runs through virtually the entire military history of the age.[109] Hence a constant compulsion on the kings to prove themselves active and successful military figures, if they were to keep the allegiance of their troops, on which their power rested. The constant bellicosity of Antiochus III and Philip V, for example, is obviously to be explained in part by the insecurity of their early years as kings. Polybius, who provides all the necessary evidence, hardly seems to appreciate this. Philip had had to assert himself against attempts from within his court to undermine his authority as military leader over his Macedonians,[110] and there was nothing the Macedonians respected so much as a warrior king.[111] Antiochus III had experienced direct challenges to his royal status and had witnessed the dangerously fluctuating loyalties of his troops.[112]

What motivated the troops above all were conditions of service and material rewards. The provision of regular pay was a constant drain on the resources of even

[105] See H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford, 1933), chapter 21; G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935), chapter 2.

[106] See M. Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* (Paris, 1949, 1950), ii.1084f. and cf. n. 67 above.

[107] Polybius 5.57.6–8 (cf. Walbank, *Commentary* i.570), Diodorus 33.4a (Seleucids); Polybius 15.25–33 (Ptolemies).

[108] This is implied by Polybius 15.25.11; see also the oath of Eumenes I and his mercenaries – after a major revolt (*OGIS* 266). Launey does not discuss the institution.

[109] Launey (n. 106), ii.690–5 for some evidence.

[110] Polybius 5.2, 4–5, 7, 14–16, 25–8.

[111] Plutarch, *Demetrius* 44 (Pyrrhus and Demetrius).

[112] Polybius 5.40–57.

the wealthiest kings, and if pay was not forthcoming, the allegiance of the troops was soon in doubt, as happened again and again throughout the period.[113] Hence the considerable importance, both for kings and for the troops, of booty as a motivation in wars, and sometimes as a motivation for wars. It is surprising that the standard modern works on Hellenistic armies have little to say about this, although they discuss at length regular pay and other conditions of service,[114] and as yet there is apparently no systematic collection of evidence for this time.[115] Yet the military narratives of the period are replete with evidence on the subject, and show how completely the practice was taken for granted. This is true throughout Diodorus' narrative of the Age of the Successors in Books 18–20. Polybius, who constantly harps on the Aetolians' lust for plunder in his account of the 'Social War' of 220–217, takes plunder as perfectly normal when it comes to the activities of the opponents of the Aetolians.[116] As far as the kings themselves were concerned, war might be described as a risk business that could be big business,[117] even when it did not lead to the acquisition of more tributary territory. A few comparative figures will illustrate this. Jerome gives the annual revenue of Egypt under Ptolemy II Philadelphus as nearly 15000 talents of silver, not including the corn dues.[118] He then goes on to cite a figure of 40000 talents of booty won by Ptolemy III from the 'Third Syrian War' of 246–5.[119] We also have on papyrus part of an account of that war, written conceivably by the king himself, or at least in his name, and it mentions casually a windfall of 1500 talents from the capture during the campaign of a Seleucid war chest in a city in Cilicia, just one small episode in a large scale campaign.[120] It should be added that the Ptolemies used their Syrian wars to make vast hauls of captives whom they then imported to Egypt to augment their military or working manpower.[121]

Much evidently remains to be investigated, and a conclusion is premature. The last word may be left instead to a well-known passage from St Augustine. Augustine, it is true, was probably reproducing material he had found in an earlier writer, and the passage expresses a popular *topos* of protest against existing forms of power, and not a considered historical verdict on monarchy.[122] Nevertheless, it is strikingly appropriate to the Hellenistic monarchies as analysed in this paper.

[113] For some examples see Préaux (n. 7), i.306–9.

[114] Griffith (n. 105), 291f., 313 and n. 2; Launey (n. 106), index s.v. 'butin' (ii.1287), but the references are all brief and unsystematic. For Rostovtzeff see n. 9 above.

[115] There is much material in the unpublished Cambridge Ph.D. thesis of A. H. Jackson, *Plundering in War and other Depredations in Greek History from 800 B.C. to 146 B.C.* (1969). See also Bikerman (n. 29), 120f. (Seleucids); Préaux (n. 7), i.297f., 308, 366–70; H. Volkmann, *Die Massenversklavungen der Einwohner eroberter Städte in der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit* (Wiesbaden, 1961), 15–25, 61–5 (unsystematic); more fully P. Ducrey (n. 34), esp. 83–92, 135–40, 159–70, 235–7.

[116] See Polybius 4.3–37, 57–87; 5.1–30, 91–105; for his views on the legitimacy of booty see especially 5.9–11 and the revealing comparison between the practice of the Romans and others in 10.16–17.

[117] Thus Préaux (n. 7), i.305.

[118] *FGrHist* 260 F 42; Rostovtzeff (n. 4), ii.1150f.

[119] F 43; Rostovtzeff does not mention or discuss this passage.

[120] *FGrHist* 160 column ii. Travelling war chests were evidently sitting targets as large sums of money were involved; cf. in the Age of the Successors Diodorus 18.52.7 (600 talents), 19.57.5 (1000 talents), 19.61.5 (500 talents), 20.108.3 (3000 talents).

[121] Ducrey (n. 34), 83–7.

[122] Augustine, *Civitas Dei* 4.4. For the ideological origin of this and similar passages see B. Shaw, *Past and Present* 105 (1984), 44–52 (51 n. 131 on Augustine's sources). The same theme occurs in connection with Alexander, but in a Scythian setting, in Quintus Curtius 9.8.12–30, esp. 19.

For if there is no justice, what are kingdoms except large robber bands? The band is also a group of men, ruled by the power of a leader (*princeps*), bound by a social compact, and its booty is divided according to an agreed law. If by constantly adding desperate men to its ranks this evil grows to the point where it secures territory, establishes a fixed seat, seizes cities and subdues peoples, then it assumes more conspicuously the name of kingdom,[123] a name openly granted to it not through any diminution of greed but through increase in impunity. For it was an elegant and truthful reply that was made to Alexander the Great by a certain pirate he had captured. For when the king asked the fellow, why it was that he should torment the sea, he replied with defiant outspokenness: 'For the same reason that you torment the world! I do it with a little ship, and so I am called a pirate. You do it with a large fleet, and so you are called a king'.[124]

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[123] For examples of this in the Hellenistic period, cf. J. Vogt, *Slavery and the Ideal of Man* (Oxford, 1974), 78–83.

[124] *Imperator* in Augustine's Latin.